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This paper outlines the contents of two 'manuscripts of modernity1 produced in
defence of the Afrikaner Boerestand in the late 1950's. My reconstruction of these
'manuscripts' is both incomplete and sketchy. I hope that their intrinsic interest to
the cultural exploration of the inner contours of Afrikaner ethnic ideology justifies
the effort below.1 The two'manuscripts of modernity' are the cumulative opinions,
ideas and objections of Afrikaner (male) academics, State officials, clerics, farmers
and members of the rural bourgeoisie in evidence to the Commission of Inquiry into
European Occupancy of the Rural Areas in the late 1950's. 2 They debate the
relationship of Af rikanerdom to modernisation in a particularly vivid way. 3 In doing
so, they demonstrate not just the contingent and protean nature of ethnicity, but
the contested nature of modernisation to Afrikanerdom. In the context of the
1950's, with Afrikanerdom ascendant, this contestation within Afrikanerdom in
regard to the Boerestand offers a unique view of how Afrikanerdom viewed the
modernisation experience on the platteland farms under Apartheid..
The first 'manuscript' outlines a vision of modernity grounded in the
Boerevolk ideal -- that "those that do the work, will ultimately rule the land." 4 It
envisaged the defence of a homogenous Afrikaner rural society - a stand -- as a
counterweight to the new arbeiderstand in the cities (the product of the
verswarting ('blackening') and ontvolking ^'depopulation') of the platteland) and
growing influence of anti-national urban capitalist interests on the State and urban
Afrikaner society in the 1950's. The Transvaaler wrote in 1956:
"No Volk can exist without a Boerestand. We naturally mean by the
Boerestand not simply landowners, but also those who ordinarily must
do the physical labour on the farms. A sound Boerestand is necessary
to serve as the basis for white civilisation in the Union (and) this
foundation must be strengthened." 5
Boerevolk promoters commented on increasing dominance of the State by the late
1950's by the 'urban interest'. This Boerevolk had to "perform the function of
preserving and implementing the national spirit and culture" against the "urban
tendency towards anglicisation":
Our history confirms the findings of sociologists that even when a
Volk loses its independence, and is overwhelmed by force of arms, if
it has a strong rural character, the Volk will in all probability be able
to preserve its individuality and its culture, and thereby recover its
political independence." e
The second 'manuscript of modernity' - a 'modernisation charter' -- at first
glance seems to be familiar to us. It outlined a development policy on the platteland
that derived from the textbooks of the most avid pro-modernisation theorists of the
1950's. Yet when analysed in its historical-cultural context, it reveals a number of
core ethnic and cultural concerns in common with Boerevolk ideologues.
Like them, these modernisation proponents identified an ethnic "crisis' within
the State that had severe repercussions for the Boerestand. The 'modern' State
was an unreliable vehicle for the defence of ethnic interests. The Boerevolk cry of
"Back to the Land" was ill-conceived in the era of modernisation and of a multi-
dimensional State. Populist programmes, almost totally predicated on State
intervention, were thus doomed to failure. The Boerevolk ideal, based on the
values, culture and material foundation of the small white rural family -- whether
on the farms, or in the platteland dorpe - was unrealistic and dangerous for
Afrikanerdom's long-term survival. Rather create the conditions, they argued, for
the emergence of a small, powerful class of Afrikaner capitalist farmers - the rural
parallel of that class of urban Afrikaner entrepreneurs - that would dominate and
transform the countryside by turning modernisation into a set of instruments for
abiding ethnic domination. For them, the State was an important instrument - but
not the instrument - of Afrikanerdom, because of its tendency by the 1950's to
emerge as a mediator between powerful interests, rather than the simple
instrument of ethnic domination. "We will not succeed in luring the youth to the
platteland by idealising farm life or by romanticising unrealistically the farm and
outdoor life," declared one official of the Department of Agriculture. "We must
develop the idea of farming as a profession rather than indulging in sickly
romanticism about mother earth, land and the boereplaas.7 By professionalising
'agriculture', practising progressive 'modern* farming, eliminating waste and
inefficiency, Afrikanerdom could turn the tide of verswarting, realise abiding rural
economic growth, revive the economies of platteland towns and thus reconstruct
a Boerestand on 'modern' foundations. To achieve this "Agriculture must once
again become a duty and a calling ~ as fulfilment of mankind's creation and
destiny, i.e. to develop the earth, to work it and to preserve it." 8
We will dwell a little on the two historical 'manuscripts of modernity'
identified above as traces of an inner dialogue within Afrikanerdom at an important
historical juncture. They comment on a number of important themes which have
explanatory power for the agro-environmental trajectory of development on the
platteland, as well as for 'Broedertwis' - interethnic contestations within
Afrikanerdom evident from 1965 onwards. In the following two sections we
explore these two 'documents of modernity' in turn.
For Boerevolk ideologues, the platteland's racial future lay in a diversified,
complex white rural society, rather than in a flourishing, but much restricted class
of highly capitalised commercial farmers. The rhetoric was dominated by concern
for the "small man." The document echoes the debates of the 1920's where the
Pact rigorously debated an appropriate "Back to the Land" strategy for poor whites.
In the 1950's "Back to the Landers" identified similar dangers to the Boerestand
that their contemporaries had identified four decades before: an imbalance between
rural and urban growth (widening divisions between town and countryside), a
distinct State funding bias in favour of urban industrial rather than rural agricultural
growth, an artificially high price for land, product prices that failed to cover
production costs, land concentration and centralisation that left the farms in the
hands of land barons or companies who farmed with "native peasants", and
extremely high capital inputs for on-farm production. In consequence the Volk was
dispossessed, its ethnic identity shaken. Afrikaners now clustered in their millions
in South Africa's cities outside the bonds of kinship and community. This process
had occurred at the expense of the Boerestand -- the mass of small, independent
landowning farmers, but also small tenant families, white agricultural workers and,
in the platteland towns, the Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie and the town labouring
class. In a rural labour market now dominated by cheap and oppressed black
workers, the rural Afrikaner youth were lost to the cities. The "reliable platteland
components" 9 of the Volk were becoming the victims, not the beneficiaries of
modernisation.
There was no better exponent of this variant of the Boerestand ideal than
Rev Johannes Rudolph Albertyn (NGK). 10 Rev Albertyn was perhaps the most
prominent Afrikaner nationalist commentator on Afrikaner social problems of his
day. His nationalist praxis went back to the turn of the century as a young dominee
in a rural Cape parish where he was first exposed to the poor white problem. He
represented the NGK to the Carnegie Commission of Enquiry into the Poor White
Problem and he compiled the Sociological Report (volume V) of the Commission.
In 1933 he became the first Chairman of the NGK Federal Council for Poor Relief
(Federate Armsorgraad) and later its secretary until 1956. In 1936, he also became
secretary for Poor Relief in the Transvaal Synod of the NGK, a post he held until
1947. He was responsible for planning the 1934 National Congress on the Poor
White Problem, held at Kimberley in October 1934. Between 1945-47 he chaired
the NGK commission into the Urbanisation of the Afrikaner. In 1947 he organised
a Johannesburg conference into Afrikaner urbanisation and complied the report
Kerk en Stad (1947). For Albertyn, the declining capacity of the Boerestand was
a nationalist tragedy and the most prominent social question of the day.
"City and countryside are equal partners, like man and wife," he proposed.
But this partnership was clearly threatened. The Boerestand was losing its stature
and had to be assisted. Nowhere was this more evident than in the equivocation
of the State on the question of platteland rehabilitation. This was a measure of the
declining political weight of the platteland: "Previously our leaders have all been
plattelander's," he noted, "but now our Parliament consists of lawyers and
businessmen." 11
An interesting feature of Albertyn's testimony is that it is not anti-modern.
He did not plead for a return to the simple, subsistence, isolated but impoverished
way of life on the platteland, or as he pithily put it "the period of the ox wagon".
Only in matching town and countryside in terms of standards of consumption and
earnings could Afrikanerdom heal the disintegrate forces that drove Afrikaners
into distinct rural and urban lives. He noted that industrialisation had brought
enormous benefits to the Volk, that "the platteland today is fuelled by the dynamic,
ambitious entrepreneurial spirit of the city, and that through new techniques of
mechanisation and so on, farming has been totally transformed." Modernisation had
thus ushered in an era of great prosperity for the Volk. New work opportunities -
many of them achieved with the assistance of the State -- made possible the
elimination of Afrikaner unemployment for the first time in the twentieth century.
Surely now an Afrikaner State could meet the national demand for a Boerestand?
Western science and culture had contributed enormously to opening up the new
economic frontiers for the Volk. Standards of living, of consumption and
expenditure, of earnings, had been tremendously enhanced by the modernisation
process. If any Afrikaner wished to have evidence of the benefits of modernisation,
Albertyn asked, they had only to note the total disappearance of the poor white
question in the period of his lifetime -- "a problem that our Volk and the churches
had been unsuccessfully grappling with for years." But the drive to industrialise, to
modernize the instruments of the economy, the society and the State had been a
mixed blessing for Afrikanerdom. It was in the Boerestand, stated Albertyn, that
the confrontation of Afrikaner values, identity and the corrosive character of the
spirit of modernity were most evident.
What dangers did urbanisation and industrialisation hold for the Volksgees,
and how would the persistence, or revitalisation of the Boerestand counter the
corrosive culture of modernity? Like Afrikaner populists before him Albertyn was
clearly anti-capitalist and anti-urban in sentiment but not opposed to progress as
such. The most powerful and evil special interest group was money-power — "die
geldmag" — that faceless conglomerate of urban industrial capital concentrated in
the cities, controlling mining, manufacturing, trade and industry. New work
opportunities for young Afrikaners in the urban labour market, new occupational
ladders and standards of consumption, new 'modern' ways of life materially
superior to that available on the platteland, drew the Afrikaner youth into the orbit
of money-power. The servants of the Volk ~ the parliamentary representatives, the
civil servants, even their military and ecclesiastical leaders -- were now
concentrated in the cities under the scrutiny and the influence of urban capitalists.
How could an Afrikaner State preserve its unique spirit and identity in such a
context?
Subjected to a constant barrage of urban propaganda by the modern mass
media -- the press, the radio, the film industry — by the new and powerful civil
institutions of urban society (the professional associations in education, social
service, welfare, law and medicine), South African society was truly becoming
urban. Even the Afrikaans churches had become urban churches (stadskerke). The
collective influence of the cities and industrial capitalism was dangerous:
The concentration of people in cities or industrial areas forms the
breeding ground for racial problems, juvenile delinquency and crime of
all kinds, and the aggravation and degradation of morals and customs.
Our Volk will lose their unique Christian heritage in the city, because
it is only on the platteland that these characteristics are built up and
preserved.
With every passing election, and every agricultural season, the platteland was
losing power to the urban centres. It was therefore not surprising that "the more
progressive, intellectual members of the Boerestand must seek their fortunes in
urban life". A powerful new urban interest -- a "mass urban Afrikaner proletariat" -
- was also emerging to challenge to old urban middle class. There was a real
danger, Albertyn noted, "that the Boerestand will no longer be the irreplaceable
partner of the city, but its servant (kneg)."
Albertyn's programme of action for the revitalisation of the Boerestand
resembled those of earlier Afrikaner populists in key areas of land reform, State
support for family farms, labour and education. Because the major problem was
depopulation (ontvolking), Albertyn opposed the tendency evident in State
agricultural policy in the late-1950*s to encourage larger, more highly capitalised
farms. Land barons, commercial companies and urban speculators with their
thousands of morgan were destroying the small farmer (die klein boer) and thereby
a more populous and viable white rural community. The elimination of small farm
schools and the centralisation of white schooling in major rural centres by
education authorities also contributed to the disappearance of the small family
farm. "The small farmer must really be brought back but not on uneconomic
farming units," he wrote. The family farm ~ the central institution of national life
in other western democracies undergoing modernisation in the post-war decade --
was the key to balanced agricultural commercialisation, rather than capitalist farms
-- 'factories-in-the-field'. "On the family farm (familieplaas) the characteristics of
the Volk will be preserved", he stated. State labour policies to channel cheap black
migrants to the cities or onto capitalist farms, that favoured the payment of high
cash wages rather than tenant farming, and that therefore threatened the 'small
man', were a direct threat to the Afrikaner rural order.
Albertyn represented a powerful strand within Afrikanerdom that questioned
the self-interest (selfsug) embodied in untrammelled commercialisation:
Some agricultural-economists even allege that our country has too
many farmers, and that even more production will be possible by
encouraging a system of even bigger farms owned by fewer farmers
with greater capital. But won't the result eventually be - as overseas
- the rise of a powerful labouring class (arbeiderstand) in our cities -
an Afrikaans proletariat, that will be the hunting ground of the
Communists, which will eventually dominate our entire national
economy through the ballot box and thereby give it an urban
complexion?
Albertyn asserted the "absolute essentiality of an independent, numerically strong,
energetic Boerestand... conscious of its great past as a Boer nation, that will
energetically make its influence felt in all spheres of national life and, like yeast...
permeate the whole land and influence it for the better".
Capitalist land accumulation was a danger to the Volk because it was finite.
Land was a treasured resource. Uneven land ownership threatened the "instinct for
possession" (die besit-instink) of the farmer that was intrinsic to his "patriotism"
(vaderlandsliefde): "If he must sell his farm then he loses that instinct. For this
reason Rev Albertyn is against large land ownership," noted Dr Vorster, the
Commission's chairman.12 "Large landownership has become an evil and the farms
are being entrusted to the care of non-whites as managers to our own demise
(ondergang), because those who do the work ultimately rule the country." 13 A
graduated land tax was necessary to prevent this: "It will bring more land onto the
market and bring the people back." 14
The Federal Council for Poor Relief noted the extent of the 'evil' of unequal
land ownership. In the Transvaal in 1956 3,764 {of approximately 26,000) farmers
owned 9,344,169 morgan or 51% of the whole province, and also 417,178
morgan in other provinces. In other words 9,761,347 morgan was owned by
1,69% of the total white population of the Transvaal and 0.31% of the whole
population of the province. 15 Afrikaner depopulation could only be reversed by
creating a more equitable rural land market. "An Afrikaans speaking proletariat is
already on the rise," it concluded, "because just think that already 11,286 owners,
or only 2.12% of South Africa's total population own more than 52,000,000
morgan of farm land in the Union which results in thousands of our Volk joining the
proletariat." 16
The debate in the post-war regarding optimum economic farming units, of
concern for soil conservation, of robber-cultivation (roofbou) etc. reflect I think a
contemporary concern as much with large-scale capitalist resource plundering, as
with the 'proliferation' of uneconomic farming units. For Albertyn, high levels of
individual land concentration and untrammelled commercialisation, led to
excessively high land prices, monocropping and overstocking to the detriment of
the newcomer on the platteland. 17 This was a consequence, some witnesses felt,
of the failure of poorly conceived populist white platteland rehabilitation
programmes that brought "impoverished people into competition with natives"
without reference to a 'civilised' standard of life. 18 "On the grounds of faulty
sociological and other theories it was believed that the simple habitation of the
platteland (by whites) as such was sufficient, on both rehabilitative and spiritual
grounds." 19 Prof DCS du Preez of PUK thus felt that "Whites will never be settled
on the platteland in large numbers unless they return there as skilled workers or as
independent farmers." 20 "If young boys want to enter farming as unskilled
sharesowers (deelsaaiers), shareworkers (deelwerkers), farm foremen or farm
managers they will have to compete with experienced natives." 21 Populist
programmes for a Boerestand thus also required retraining to ease the adaptation
of Afrikaners to a renewed life on the land.
Albertyn wanted to revitalise the rural white labour market that was
undermined by the creation of a national one dominated by strong urban employers.
In this national labour market the State and a powerful new white urban proletariat
had carved out a special place for unskilled white workers in the industrial
conglomerates and in the civil service. Job reservation and Christian National trade
union's thus drew white families irresistibly from the Boerestand into urban
industrial occupations for which they were spiritually, educationally, and culturally
quite unsuited. The city thus swallowed up the very people whose experience
marked them for a future "landheer" -- not simply as land owners, but as potential
rural labour aristocrats. Even Prof Tomlinson believed in the myth of white labour
competitiveness: "It will pay," he said, "to incorporate whites on the farms. Many
whites cannot become farm owners. We are not making the best use of our white
human resources and we are using them only in certain reserved jobs in the cities;
therefore the platteland is becoming 'bantu-ised.'" 22
Albertyn felt that urban job reservation undermined the capacity of farmers
to compete for unskilled and semi-skilled white workers. State education policy on
the platteland - -w i th its 'academic' bias - undermined the competitiveness of
white farmers to attract white labour to the farms. Also by favouring the
centralisation of all schools -- primary and secondary - in selected regional
platteland towns the provincial authorities undermined the Boerestand by
destroying the widely-dispersed farm schools that had maintained a physical link
between the child, the family and the farm in the past. 23 There should be no
education for blacks on the platteland: white farmers would always prefer cheaper
7black labour than more expensive white labour, and why unduly penalise white
workers by in addition educating and training black workers? The 'blackening'
(verswarting) of the platteland would be encouraged in two ways through policies
based on training a more efficient and effective black labour force. White farm
families would be replaced with cheaper, and more exploitable black farm families -
- a countryside dominated by a 'landheer' with a black peasantry, or as the Under
Secretary for Agriculture, SJde Swart put it, a "kafferboerdery." 24 Secondly, skills
training would draw black farm workers to urban industries, and they would leave
their families -- uneconomic labour units -- behind on the white farms to be
supported by white farmers.
Albertyn was especially suspicious of the innovations of Prof Tomlinson, and
the SABRA intellectuals in general, to revitalise the Reserves as Bantustans to
absorb blacks turned back from the urban areas by influx controls. Black farm
families were necessary on the small white family farms as tenants/workers. It
would not be wise, even practical, to eliminate a black presence on the platteland
altogether until the tide of white depopulation (ontvolking) was reversed. White
family immigration schemes would help reduce the need to maintain black farm
families and physically strengthen the platteland. These white immigrants, Albertyn
suggested, ought to have a farm background. Care must be taken to ensure that
they could be assimilated easily into the culture of the Boerestand. For this reason,
suggested Dr Slabbert, the "father of the white farm labour immigration scheme" 25
these immigrants could be drawn from Eastern European refugees fleeing
Communist aggression -- especially from Poland, Rumania and Hungary. 26
Albertyn thus called for a broad policy initiative - economic, cultural and
spiritual - to revive of the Boerestand, through the nurturing of a Boerevolk. The
State had a central role to play in this, but its obligation had to be to Af rikanerdom
exclusively. The central State role was to ensure security of Afrikaner tenure on the
land, because "attachment to the land is the foundation of patriotism" 27 :
The farmer is the largest owner of fixed property in the cquntry... .
His constant interaction with nature advances his relationship with the
God of nature. He is constantly aware of the wonder of the creation
of new life in animals and plants and he contributes to the creation.
Attachment to the land (Bodemvastheid) and a bonding with nature
(natuurgebondenheid) is the foundation stone of all national progress.
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Private land ownership stood as a symbol of the Volk's natural aversion to
socialism, and a commitment to the nationalist project. Dr CC Nepgen put it this
way: "The agriculturalists as a professional group are the largest owners of
immovable property. Percentage wise, the platteland population owns more land
and houses than city dwellers. This economic fact has important social
consequences: the farmer is always a strong supporter of private ownership, and
is certainly always opposed to the communist ideology." 29
Social and biological revitalisation, however, would require the revitalisation
of the farm family ('boeregesin'). In Nepgens words, "The members of the "Good
Family" are the genuine aristocrats of the platteland and of the country." 30 The
family farm - familieplaas/boereplaas -- was the bulwark of the agricultural
economy and the basic unit of the nations's structure, of "the genuine,
unadulterated Afrikaans way of life." 31 To recover its essential values for
Afrikanerdom - "an honourable, morally distinguished personal and family life, love
of liberty and sense of religion" 32 — the family farm would have to be nurtured and
protected by the State from a national market dominated by vested urban interests.
This was the reason given for the necessity of product control boards and
agricultural co-operatives.
On the Boereplaas, stated Mr DP van der Merwe, of Brondal (Eastern
Transvaal) there was a "deeply-rooted attachment and love between the farm child
and his farm, his nation, and his Volk."
It is an utterance from the soul when the child speaks of: my dad, my
mom, our grandparents, our pioneers, the Voortrekkers, our church,
our minister, our member of Parliament, our farm-hands, our mealie-
fields, our cattle, our farm, our landmarks, our fountain, the plovers
on our koppie (little hill), my horse, my rifle, my nanny, our evening
prayers... . The national history affects him to the extent that it
effects those dear to him ~ his father, his mother, his grandparents,
his minister, our general, our commmandos, our struggle, our defeat
or our victory. Layer by layer, additions are made to the mutual family
and national monument: the solid structure which, in its silence and
isolation, continues to be built upon, undisturbed by foreign or
external influences. The invisible bonds bind together in the national
life a personality strong and full of character." 33
The Boerestand was taxed with an historical task: "In the past our boerestand was
the protector and watchman of the Volk's spiritual treasures. The farm family
(boeregesin) was always one of the bulwarks of an agricultural economy rooted in
the soil and honourable in its motives." 34 The revitalisation of the bqeregesin was
a cultural/national project.
The waning political power of the Boerestand was a function of its decline.
The State had to restore it to its place in the life of the nation:
Up to about a quarter century ago agriculturalists were strongly
represented in our national gatherings (volksvergaderinge) -- our
leaders of State and our military leaders were nearly all practical
farmers. The platteland's influence set the tone, and farmers' interests
occupied an important place in national policy. Today the position has
been reversed and it is overwhelmingly town and city people --
lawyers, teachers and businessmen - who sit in our highest councils
(raadsale). 35
Even programmes designed to rehabilitate white rural communities - such as the
Orange River Irrigation Scheme - were shelved by the State in favour of urban
interests, such as the Sasol project, and the Van der Bijl Park Iron and Steel
development. 36
Albertyn suggested that the State focus on building a "representative
Boerestand", that is, one composed of Afrikaners drawn from all classes of
Afrikaner rural society. 37 To make this viable, the State had to combat the
tendency towards larger farming units. He suggested a graduated land tax for this
purpose, and differential access to State resources. By providing more State
assistance for small and aspirant young farmers, the State could also create a
meaningful ladder of opportunity for white workers on the land so that they could
rise to the level of independent farmers. This would also introduce new blood into
the Boerestand, based on enterprise and initiative, rather than inherited wealth. A
rural colour bar, perhaps erected through rural technical training for white workers
(and its denial to black farm workers) would assist in keeping a white work force
on the farms as mechanisation progressed. And by extending (rather than limiting)
irrigation settlements and lands department programmes, small farms constituted
of young Afrikaner men and women would biologically and economically breed a
new rural society. Modernisation was also to be shackled more closely to this
nationalist and ethnic project. Mass electrification programmes should span the
platteland. Post and telephone services would meld the isolated farms into a rural
community. Improved platteland health care, more farm schools, expanded and
extended agricultural services by provincial unions and extension officers, a new
rural radio service, would capture the platteland in a net of appropriately modern
services.
Albertyn's extended discussion is interesting for the linkages it exposes
between modernisation and nationalism. Material progress of the Boerestand must
guarantee "the satisfaction of his spiritual needs and instincts". This would only
happen if mediated through spiritual and cultural values. This broad policy would
be predicated on a thorough understanding of Afrikaner "mentality." Because
"Boere live in a different sphere (dampkring) to urbanites they think differently, they
experience things differently, and they do business differently."
There were six distinctive spiritual/cultural values that the Boerestand
contributed to Afrikanerdom. Through isolation the Volk received its moral and
entrepreneurial backbone: "In his life and endeavours he looks solely to himself for
success. He lives in his own working area without any interference from others."
This bred "independence... initiative and resourcefulness". The Boerestand satisfied
the urge for self-realisation. A life on the land offered "abundant opportunities for
self-expression... opportunities to do something for his people".
On the platteland the Boerestand refined the instinct for self-preservation
(veiligheidsdrang) that urbanisation undermined:
It is difficult for the urbanite, surrounded by his neighbours, by
streetlights, by policemen, to understand the fear complex of the
farmer on his isolated farm. Fear of attack on dark nights, fear of
sudden sickness and death, whilst far from medical assistance. Fear
of natural disaster and droughts, of over-production, falling markets.
Fears that he will be outwitted in the marketplace by the middleman.
It is this fear that sometimes makes the farming community
suspicious, querulous and unhappy with his lot.
But through this instinct to self-preservation the Volk acquired determination and
collective will to survive. The instinct for possession was inherent in theBoerstand:
"It is traditional for them to own fixed property. When a strong farmer buys up
neighbouring farms at high prices, he sometimes does not grasp the violence he
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does to the instinct for possession of the previous owners. An integral part of the
State's farming policy (boerebeleid) must be to protect and develop the instinct for
possession of farmers." Die family urge - the fundamental building block of a Volk-
was rural in origin. Both scripture and biology showed this:
On the relatively isolated platteland, Afrikaner family life reached its
fullest expression - the farmer was more member of a family than an
individual. More than anything else it was the honourable family life
of the platteland that set the tone for our Volk's character. We think
of how family-daft the farmer was, how attached to his family origins,
how respectful of his parents, how seldom we saw divorce or
abandonment.
And in the religious consciousness of the Boerestand resided the spiritual values of
the Volk: "today, more than ever before, the Volk depends on the Boerestand as
their religious anchor in a time of rapid change and lack of faith."
Albertyn's 'manuscript' vividly portrays the cultural and ethnic concerns of
a collective identity being shaped by modernisation. The Boerevolk 'ideal' is
revealed as a dynamic and creative response to the challenge of modernisation.
The second important 'manuscript of modernity' is the modernisation charter.
Its major author was Dr PW Vorster, the head of Agricultural Extension in the
Department of Agriculture, and the chairman of the commission. Aspects of this
document are often discussed in the historiography as the policy of "organised
agriculture" - often simply description of isolated policy decisions of the South
African Agricultural Union (SAAU). But these accounts often present the
proponents of modernisation as simply a-culturalised, often a-politicised capitalists,
unmoved by or at the least increasingly alienated from ethnic priorities. This is a
very hasty judgement, as the recent affiliation of the Transvaal Agricultural Union
to the Afrikaner Volksfront testifies. Contemporary debates distinctly reflected a
more culturally and politically charged content.
Like Rev Albertyn, Dr Vorster spoke of the "spiritual, moral and cultural
aspects of our agricultural industry" thrown out of relation by modernisation:
In this machine age everything stands in the image of mechanisation.
There is a real danger that science and the development of technology
are getting out of hand. Mankind is not only becoming slave to the
machine, but is living in the greatest fear that he will be obliterated by
his own discoveries. An atomic anxiety psychosis is evident
everywhere with a crippling effect on society. 38
In phraseology resonant with the later prose of Marcuse, Vorster spoke of
the rise of a powerful urban industrial complex, made possible by specialisation,
efficiency and mass-production. In these "factory cities" - "forests of concrete and
steel" -- clustered masses of faceless proletarians under the all-powerful eye of a
techno-industrial complex:
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In the large industries where all processes are mechanised and
planned and organised to the last detail, man as labourer is degraded
to a mere cog or wheel in a colossal factory mechanism. The labourer
thereby loses responsibility and freedom. He becomes a sort of
automaton. Labour becomes a commodity whose value is measured
only in terms of money.
Materialism, wrote Vorster, controlled the whole life of mankind and "everything
stands in the image of the planner":
"All the activities of the modern mass-man (massa-mens) are planned
by the power brokers (bewindhebbers). His whole life is organised for
him and controlled and directed from above... . By means of mass
propaganda -- the press and the radio -- mankind is told what to think
and what to do. The individual is no longer expected to think for
himself, to make decisions or to bear any responsibility. In modern
business there is a deliberate levelling process or massification
{massaf isering) of all the national questions, and the drive for equality
becomes dogma."
For individuals, modernisation — the "revolution of the twentieth century" —
was experienced in growing State control and interference: "Dependence on the
State and State Socialism go hand in hand." This was linked with a fundamental
and all-pervasive moral and spiritual crisis:
The traditional Christian viewpoint and the moral principles of Western
civilisation are vanishing. The foundations of Christianity are
everywhere being undermined... . Secularisation is evident on all
fronts. Western man is becoming totally without religion. The mass-
man possesses only a materialistic and nihilistic philosophy and is
busy losing his grip on the purpose of life. Everywhere we encounter
a process of decadence and disintegration.
South Africa was caught up in these universal changes. This was evident in
developments in industry and mining in the last twenty years. A powerful new
working class had emerged, accompanied by large scale rural depopulation. The old
components of Afrikanerdom's ethnic alliance were increasingly restless in a
modern world.
In agriculture - Vorster understood this to mean within the white commercial
sector -- the practices and character of the farming profession had been changed
beyond recognition. On farms, large-scale mechanisation transformed farming into
an industrial process:
Farming displays more and more the features of a technological food-
processing industry in which the role of the industrial leader or
entrepreneur becomes ever more significant. The application of the
principles of the factory, especially in planning, organisation and
effective productivity, become essential in modern agriculture.
Mechanisation had entirely transformed the atmosphere and milieu of the farm -
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barns and kraals are metamorphosed into workshops. The farmer no longer cares
only for animals and plants, but is also a mechanic or agricultural engineer.
Organisational, scientific and technical specialisation transformed South African
farmers into managers. Within one generation:
the character and principles of agriculture in this country have
undergone a total metamorphosis. The isolation of the farm is a thing
of the past. On many farms the same amenities are found which only
urbanites were privileged to possess. Together with these amenities,
the spirit of the city has taken its place in the life of the farm.
The traditional farm life was disappearing and the lifestyle and practices of the
town and the city were becoming fashionable on the platteland. Modernisation,
Vorster concluded, had totally secularised farm life.
Afrikaner farmers thus had to adapt to modernisation. And contrary to the
prevailing view that they were failing in this test, in their rapid assimilation of
modern farming systems and their adoption of technological advances. South
African farmers were second to none in the Western world. This had brought great
material advances to the rural population. But there were other problems that
accompanied modernisation. These were moral and spiritual problems -- "the non-
material aspects of agriculture":
The crisis facing agriculture is not in the first instance a question of
production, soil erosion, price or economics, but has a deeper root
cause which is connected with the general spiritual crisis of the times.
It concerns the very basic questions of the life and principles of
Christian civilisation.
In this concern, Vorster's modernisation charter closely tracked a central concern
of the Boerevolk document. The real meaning of agriculture as a national issue lay
in its rootedness in the Christian character of the boerebevolking: "that our
forefathers, as children of the Reformation, honoured the Calvinist way of life."
The Volk's identity and character grew out of the Boerestands' unique
Christian rural way of life and their philosophy. The "religious foundations of
agriculture and our Christian practice" were thus fundamental to the Volk's national
struggle. Like Albertyn, Vorster centred the theological meaning of the Boerestand
in the Calvinist Calling. God planted Adam, the first "worker of the soil,
husbandman or farmer", in the Garden of Eden. "The garden, or if you like, the
farm, was the original and natural home of man." This cemented the sacred trilogy
of land, agriculture and the Calling:
This love and attachment to the earth and the farm has always been
the most unique characteristic of the South African farmer. In the
past, as well as today, to many owners the family farm is a holy
shrine with such sentimental value that money cannot buy it from
them... . To be a farmer is in their blood.
Because of God's wisdom, man was at his happiest when working the earth (die
bodem). Through this Calling, mankind developed the characteristics that God
13
determined. Thus by nurturing the Boerestand, God moulded the sacred character-
- the traditional virtues -- of the Afrikaner Volk: "hard-work, thriftiness,
perserverence, independence, a strongly developed spirit of freedom, and
patriotism, hospitality (and) attachment to tradition". And through the Boerestand,
God worked His will on the Volk:
In our country Calvinist philosophy has made a large contribution to
the development of a unique Boere outlook and life-style on the
platteland. A healthy and strong family life with respect for moral and
spiritual values was always the pride of the Boere community... .
Therefore a healthy and prosperous Boerestand is also one of the
greatest treasures that a Volk can possess.
The ethnic and nationalist agenda at the theological core of a Calvinist Boerestand
was not antithetical to modernisation. Rather, the nationalist project could be
enhanced by meeting the challenge of modernity as part of the Divine plan. Thus,
Vorster explained, through science and technology "Mankind has found, with God's
help, the most powerful and effective means on earth to create and control and
thereby to satisfy his cultural task. The practise of science and culture is thus the
duty and calling of mankind." Science contributed hugely to increased production:
The application of science to agriculture has made it possible for
fewer and fewer farmers to produce for more and more people. This
emphasises the necessity of more agricultural research especially as
South Africa industrialises so rapidly and its population increases so
quickly.
Agriculture (landboubeoefening) is therefore the "realisation of the task of creation
and destiny of man." Only through scientific progress would the Boerestand meet
the challenges of the modern age.
In meeting this challenge, the State played an important, but contradictory
role. It was a crucial instrument of progress, but because its powers grew from a
universal, immutable impulse, its was an unreliable instrument for the particularist
needs of the Volk. Thus Vorster asserted the independence of the Boerestand from
the State, as a separate sphere, a "stand" (station), rather than a fraction of a class
of bourgeois entrepreneurs. He stated:
Taken as a whole the Boer community of South Africa possesses
more freedom and independence than any other. Even the marketing
and soil-conservation laws are grounded largely on democratic
principles. The laws are in any event a compromise between full
farmer responsibility and total State control. So long as the farming
community acknowledge and meet their responsibilities in full, the
danger of total state domination of farmers should not arise.
The Boerestand's sovereignty in its own circle (in eie kring) was necessary to
preserve its Christian democratic principles. Individual entrepreneurial freedom was
in this way bound up with community responsibility and accountability: "A person
is only free when aware of his Task and Calling."
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In this rural world there was clearly no room for unprogressive farmers -
farmers unwilling to be filled with the spirit of progress. Vorster opposed State
intervention in rural markets. This State patronage for unprogressive farmers was
'artificial' as it violated the independence of the Boerestand in its own circle, and
eased the transition to State socialism. The State's role ought to be restricted to
smoothing out obstacles in the path of individual effort, streamlining the flow of
technical and scientific inputs, and preserving the sovereignty of the Boerestand in
their own sphere "against exploitation and domination by other established
concerns." That is, against foreign capital and urban Jewish middlemen, cartels and
monopolies controlling agricultural supplies, rural Indian middlemen and black share-
croppers.
Vorster and Albertyn thus agreed on the centrality of the Boerestand to the
Volkslewe, but Vorster felt that this role would be achieved by "healthy
development of the farming industry" based upon individual enterprise, not a
collective effort for mutual support. Production should be maximised through
scientific methods, but in harmony with nature: "In this way the platteland will
become a source of moral power for the Volk. It will serve as a bulwark against all
dangerous and foreign (volksvreemde) influences" By embracing modernisation
within the framework of the Calvinist world view the Boerestand's future role was
assured:
Even though on the farms all the modern urban amenities may be
encountered and scientific farming practices are applied, the
platteland can still preserve its own lifestyle, so that urbanisation of
the rural population can be stemmed. Even if farmers make up an ever
smaller percentage of the total population, their influence on the
volkslewe does not need to wane.
An acceptance of the naturalness of Afrikaner rural proletarianisation thus
underpinned Vorster arguments: "A prosperous Boer community, of strong
character, and conscious of its calling, is the ideal and objective for which (farmers)
and the Department of Agriculture are striving."
The professionalisation of agriculture was vital to the Calling identified by
Vorster, yet this technical imperative was shackled to a romantic nationalist
programme, rooted in the Boerestand ideal, as a counter the corrosive Godless
modernist spirit:
Farmers, especially in South Africa, should have a special heartfelt
love of farming, such as the love of farm life, a bond with the earth,
and so on. This was the hidden power of our farming profession in the
past. It allowed our fathers to rise above almost overwhelming
difficulties, whilst also being the bearers of Western civilisation in the
South African interior.
In practical terms, the modernisation charter's programme of action
underpinned rural renewal with capitalist entrepreneurship. Dr le Clus of the South
African Agricultural Union (SAAU) felt, for example, that "we cannot go against
economic tendencies because of social concerns" because "An economically
healthy and strong platteland will be more stable and enduring than a weak
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platteland with more people." 39 The SAAU justified agricultural policies that led to
rural depopulation (ontvolking) on grounds that the physical number of whites on
the platteland was not the first criteria, but rather that farmers should "make a
living and so preserve the good characteristics of a rural way of life." The
Boerestand required only "healthy... independent farmers". 40 Without an
"economically independent Boerestand, there could be none of those desired
sociological influences of the platteland elsewhere in the national life." 41
The bantu-isation (verbantoeing) of the platteland was to be reversed by
implementation of the "Squatters Law" and labour-saving mechanisation to break
the back of the "old labour system". Inter-racial shareworking and other 'inefficient'
production systems would be eliminated, and the 'subsistence' household -- both
white and black farm families - removed as a factor on the platteland. This would
resolve the crisis of free labour, and eliminate 'uneconomic' use of the land. "(l)f
plots were uneconomic then the boer was a danger to the stability of the
platteland", stated the SAAU. 42 Progress would naturally eliminate the small man
from the platteland and this was a good thing. There was no space in the capitalist
Boerestand for unprogressive and inefficient farmers. 43
The SAAU held that the direction of State rehabilitation policies - especially
schemes of the Department of Lands that provided small farms to rehabilitated
farmers - were anachronistic — and expensive - as "farmers could not... find good
white employees, and a poor white manager was seldom economical. 44
Rehabilitation programmes -- based on the principle of small family farms — were
uneconomic and uncompetitive. Affiliates of the Union explained that most white
families leaving the platteland did so "because they could no longer make a living
on the farms", that is, they were poor farmers. 45
Industrial systems of labour supply implemented by the Apartheid State also
inhibited the economic viability of small family farms:
"Labour problems have also helped to demoralise (ontmoedig) the
small farmer. Many farmers confronted labour problems, and with
insufficient capital to mechanise, trek rather to the cities, than adopt
the American and British practice of working smaller farms with the
help of their own families. This family farm system is also not possible
in many parts of our country. The system of ploughing, planting and
harvesting crops on contract as practised in America does not exist
at ail in SA. 46
For this reason - the improbability of the white rural family farm system emerging
on the platteland independent of the labour of black farm families - the SAAU saw
in urban industrialisation the 'real' long term solution to the disintegration of the
'old' Boerevolk ideal.
The major challenge to development planners in agriculture was thus
economic, stated the SAAU. Unless farming became economically attractive, the
Afrikaner project -- the effective and viable long term occupation of the land --
would fail. White rural immigration programmes to bolster this project, as envisaged
by Rev Albertyn and other white Boerestand romantics, were thus doomed at the
outset. 47 As with Dr Vorster, the SAAU held that "In the majority of districts the
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economic position of the farmers is such that there is very little opportunity for new
(white) immigrants, unless measures are taken to improve the economic position
of the present inhabitants." 48 The future for non-landholding whites on the
platteland was thus equally dim. In reply to questionnaires sent to affiliates
enquiring about positions for young white men on farms as sharesowers,
shareworkers, foremen, managers or labourers, there were only 85 vacancies in
Natal, 40 in the OFS, 50 in the Cape stock region, 125 in the rest of the Cape, and
150 in total in the Transvaal. 49
The depopulation of the platteland, the SAAU pointed out, was inevitable:
The cry: back to the land cannot stop the process. No matter how
much is spoken and written on the subject, the process cannot be
reversed because it is simply an unalterable economic law. The
movement between city and countryside will eventually balance out.
The fundamental motive for the trek of our rural population to the
cities is their desire to improve their economic position. The farmer's
son (boereseun) will remain on the farm if it pays him. 50
Whilst farming was an occupational field for 'Super-Afrikaners', rural employment
off the farms in the platteland towns offered the possibility for a rural life for those
'victims' of modernisation: "It appears," stated the SAAU, "as if our struggle must
rather be: 'back to the platteland village' where a rural way of life could be
preserved without the invidious influences of the large cities." 51 "Perhaps if we
want a larger platteland population," mused one SAAU representative, "our biggest
need is employment opportunities, and this we can only do by establishing rural
industry wherever material resources, power, labour, water and transport make this
possible." 52 This line of reasoning based on industrial decentralisation, platteland
racial zoning, black migrancy, and the restructuring of the platteland towns as
"white islands" became a central plank of the SAAU's development programme for
the platteland. 53
IV
As 'manuscripts of modernity1 the Boerestand charters of the late 1950ls
voice the wider cultural dissonances within Afrikanerdom at the political climax of
Apartheid power. They also demonstrate the contested character and contingency
of both ethnicity and modernisation. As Newman comments: "In the course of
modernization ethnic political identities and institutions are repeatedly created and
re-created anew, a process that constantly destroys the old ethnic loyalties while
creating new ethnic ideologies, institutions, and constituencies." 54 The
modernisation process, in the subjective perception of authors of these
'manuscripts of modernity', generated uneven ideological and organisational
resources for different elements within the Volk. But it also transformed their view
of modernisation as a 'natural' process with a common form. For Boerevolk
advocates in the late 1950's conflicts over the form of modernisation -- the
development strategies backed by the State -- with the "modernisation charterists'
did not detract from its value as a process. Rather, it cemented their demand for
an exclusive Afrikaner State -- a "Boereplaas", in the words of Gagiano --
dominated by 'genuine' Afrikaner leaders grounded in the 'true' values of the
Boerestand who would understand that "those who do the work, will ultimately
rule the land." 55
17
1. This idea is drawn from a suggestion offered by Saul Newman,
"Does Modernisation Breed Ethnic Conflict?", World Politics, 43,
(April 1991), 451-178.
2. See Union of South Africa. Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into European Occupancy of the Rural Areas. G.P.-S.7029095-1959.
For the unpublished evidence of the Commission, see Central
Archives Depot (CAD), State Archives, Pretoria, Commission Number
K103.
3. This paper does not address the question of whether Afrikaner
ethnic identity was eroded or not by modernisation, but rather
the inner content of the ethnic political debate about modernity.
The major texts that explore this period are therefore not
utilised in this paper. But for the relationship between
Afrikanerdom and the Apartheid State, see D. Posel, The Making
of Apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1991), and H. Gilliomee, "Broedertwis: Intra-Afrikaner
Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid" African Affairs
(1992), 91, 339-364.
4. CA, K103, Box 3, Stuk 156, Formal Evidence, 27 May 1958, Ds
M. 'Postma: Gereformeerde Gemeente, De Aar, p.30.
5. Die Transvaler 25 August 1956 "Versterk die Boerestand."
6. Central Archives (CA) , Report of the Commission of
Investigation of White Occupancy of the Platteland (K103),
Bylaes, Box 2, Stuk 93, Dr CC Nepgen "Die Funksie van die
Platteland in ons Volksbestaan," p.16.
7. Stuk 76, Dr PW Vorster, Reprint from Farming in South Africa
October 1956, Kln Heerlike Taak", p.2.
8. Ibid., p.4.
9. 10 June 1958, Evidence: Dr C.H. Neveling: Acting Secretary of
Agriculture, p.9?
10. Johannes Rudolph Albertyn, b. Middelburg, Cape Colony 6.8.
1878; d. Cape Town 14.11.1967. The Dictionary of South African
Biography describes him as "Minister of the NGK and authority on
social problems." (C.J. Beyers, Editor in Chief, Dictionary of
South African Biography (Durban and Pretoria, 1981), Volume IV,
3-4) Albertyn pleaded in the 1930's for the State to take over
all welfare services with Ds P. du Toit, the first secretary of
the new department of Social Welfare. He received an Honoury
Doctorate from the University of Pretoria in sociology and social
work in 1949.
11. CA, K103, Box 3, Stuk 156, Verbatim Evidence, 2 June 1958,
Dr J.R. Albertyn (for the Federal Council for Poor Relief of the
NGK), p.52. The section below is based on Albertyn's verbatim
evidence, and his written statement at CA, K103, Box 3, Bylaes,
Stuk 146, Dr JR Albertyn, (on behalf of the Federal Council for
Poor Relief of the NGK), "Die Onmisbaarheid van 'n Getalsterke
Geeskragitge Boerestand".
12. Albertyn, Op.Cit., Bylae 156, p.53.
13. CA, K103, Stuk 156, 27 May 1958, Dr Postma: Gereformeerde
Gemeente, De Aar, p.31.
14. Albertyn, Op.Cit., Stuk 156, p.53
15. Stuk 99, Federal Council for Poor Relief, p.l.
16. Ibid., p.3.
17. Albertyn, Op.Cit., Stuk 156, p.53-54; Stuk 146, p.2,5.
18. CA, K103, Stuk 31, 27 June 1956, DCS du Preez, PUK (Dept
Sosiologie en Maatskaplike Sorg), "Memorandum i.s. Blanke




22. CA, K103, Stuk 156, 24 June 1958, Regional Directors of the
Department of Agriculture, p.99.
23. For an exploration of the relationship between education and
rural white rehabilitation, see T. Clynick and A. Paterson,
"Rural Schools: The Salvation of Poor Whites?" in Matlhasedi
12 (1), July 1993, 21-25.
24. CA, K103, Stuk 156, 9 June 1958, Evidence of S.J. de Swardt,
Under Secretary of Agriculture, p.87.
25. CA, K103, Op.Cit., Stuk 156, 24 June 1958 (Regional Directors
of the Department of Agriculture), p.102; 30 June 1958 Mr A.R.
Haveman {Chief: Division Economics and Marketing) and Prof F.R.
Tomlinson, p.109.
26. Ibid., p.102.
27. Albertyn, Op.Cit., Stuk 146, p.3.
28. Ibid., p.3.
29. CA, K103, Box 2, Bylaes, Stuk 93, Dr C.C. Nepgen "Die Funksie
van die Platteland in ons Volksbestaan," p.9.
30. Ibid., p.17.
31. Albertyn, Op.Cit., Stuk 146, p.3.
32. Ibid.. p.4.
33. CA, K103, Box 2, Bylae, Stuk 45, Memorandum by D.P. van der
Merwe, Brondal, Eastern Transvaal, "Die Ontvolking van die
Platteland," p.l.
34. Albertyn, Op.Cit., Stuk 146, p.4.
35. Ibid.
19
36. Albertyn, Op.Cit., Stuk 156, p.52.
37. Albertyn, Op.Cit., Stuk 146, p.7. The following section of
the paper is drawn from this reference in i t s entirety.
38. CA, K103, Box 2, Bylae, Stuk 70, Dr P.W. Vorster
"Boerderybedryf gefundeer op Christelike Grondslag, " reprint from
Primary Producer, 4 March 1955. Vorster's 'manuscript1 is
constructed from the above ar t ic le and his verbatim evidence.
39. Stuk 79, "Streng Vetroulik. South African Agricultural Union.
Memorandum vir voorlegging aan "Die Kommissie van Ondersoek na






















47. Ibid., p. 14. In the Transvaal, of 85 farmers associations who gave figures, in
only eight were the majority of farmers able to earn incomes of more than $1000
per year and in only one case did more than a quarter of farms deliver more than
$2000 per year. In 75 cases the majority of farms earned lower than $1000 per
year (and in 25 cases all the farms did so). In 40 cases the majqrity of farms
earned less than $500 per year. In 7 cases all farms earned less than $500 per
year." [Ibid., p. 15)
48. Ibid., p.16.
49. Ibid., p. 16.
50. Ibid., p. 18.
51. Ibid., p.10.
52. SAAU, Verbatim Evidence, 22 May 1958.
53. CA, K103, Box 2, Bylaes, Dok36/57, SAA<U, "Supplementary Memorandum for
Submission to the Commission of Enquiry into European Occupancy of the Rural
Areas," p.1.
54. Newman, Op.Cit., p.452.
55. JIKGagiano. 'Meanwhile backon the "Boereplaas"', Politikon. 13(1986), pp.3-
21.
